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Abstract 
 
A prevailing debate in the psychological literature concerns the domain-specificity of the face 
recognition system, where evidence from typical and neurological participants has been 
interpreted as evidence that faces are “special”. Although several studies have investigated 
the same question in cases of developmental prosopagnosia, the vast majority of this evidence 
has recently been discounted due to methodological concerns. This leaves an uncomfortable 
void in the literature, restricting our understanding of the typical and atypical development of 
the face recognition system. The current study addressed this issue in 40 individuals with 
developmental prosopagnosia, completing a sequential same/different face and biological 
(hands) and non-biological (houses) object matching task, with upright and inverted 
conditions. Findings support domain-specific accounts of face-processing for both hands and 
houses: while significant correlations emerged between all the object categories, no condition 
correlated with performance in the upright faces condition. Further, a categorical analysis 
demonstrated that, when face matching was impaired, object matching skills were classically 
dissociated in six out of 15 individuals (four for both categories). These findings provide 
evidence for domain-specificity in developmental disorders of face recognition, and present a 
theoretically-driven means of partitioning developmental prosopagnosia. 
 
 
Keywords: Developmental prosopagnosia; domain specificity; face recognition; face 
perception; visual agnosia. 
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The Domain-Specificity of Face Matching Impairments in 
40 Cases of Developmental Prosopagnosia 
 
1. Introduction 
Prosopagnosia is a visuocognitive condition that is characterized by an inability to recognise 
others by their face. It has traditionally been studied in individuals who acquire face 
recognition difficulties following neurological injury (acquired prosopagnosia: AP; Barton, 
2008; Bate et al., 2015; Dalrymple et al., 2011; Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982), 
but has more recently been documented in a larger number of people with developmental 
origins (developmental prosopagnosia: DP; Bennetts, Murray, Boyce & Bate, 2017; Bowles 
et al., 2009; Duchaine, 2008). Several investigations indicate that DP is a heterogeneous 
condition (e.g. Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Burns, et al., 2017; Le Grand et al., 2006; 
Minnebusch, Suchan, Ramon & Daum, 2007; Schmalzl, Palermo & Coltheart, 2008), 
although there has been little progress in establishing specific phenotypes. While the 
similarities between AP and DP are still being investigated, the former offers a broad yet 
theoretically-driven starting point for the partitioning of its developmental equivalent: the 
presence or absence of co-morbid impairments in object processing (e.g. De Renzi, 1986; 
Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995; McNeil & Warrington, 1993). 
Much work has examined object recognition abilities in AP as a means to inform the 
long-standing debate regarding the domain-specificity of the face recognition system 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Logothetis, 2000; Kanwisher, 2017; McCarthy, Puce, 
Gore & Allison, 1996). While case studies of APs with preserved object recognition skills 
have supported modular accounts of functionally distinct cortical face and object 
representations (Busigny, Graf, Mayer & Rossion, 2010; Kanwisher, 2017; McCarthy et al., 
1996; Sergent & Signoret, 1992), some suggest that those with more widespread impairments 
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in visual recognition (e.g. Bukach et al., 2012; Gauthier, Behrmann & Tarr, 1999) support 
domain-general hypotheses of distributed cortical function (e.g. Behrmann & Plaut, 2015; 
Haxby et al., 2001) and/or common underlying mechanisms for different object categories 
(e.g. sensitivity to curvature: Nasr, Echavarria & Tootell, 2014; Ponce, Hartmann & 
Livingstone, 2017; spatial frequency: Woodhead, Wise, Sereno & Leech, 2011; reliance on 
holistic processing: Richler, Palmeri & Gauthier, 2012). 
Despite there being many more cases of DP available for investigation, progress has 
been slow. While individuals with preserved (Dobel, Bolte, Aicher & Schweinberger, 2007; 
Duchaine, Dingle, Butterworth & Nakayama, 2004; Duchaine, Germine & Nakayama, 2007) 
or impaired (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta & Kimchi, 2005; Duchaine et al., 2007; Esins et al., 
2016) object recognition skills have been reported, many studies only report accuracy data. 
Such work has been questioned by claims that seemingly normal object recognition 
performance may be underpinned by laboured or sub-optimal processing strategies (Gauthier, 
Behrmann & Tarr, 1999; but see Rossion, 2018; Starrfelt & Robotham, 2018, for discussion). 
A second limitation of previous work on object agnosia in DP is that many studies 
have only examined one comparison object, making it difficult to determine whether the 
individual represents a true case of pure prosopagnosia without object agnosia. However, in a 
recent review of all DPs cases reported to date, Geskin and Behrmann (2018) noted that when 
more than two object categories were included, no individual was classified as having intact 
object recognition. Unfortunately, this introduces a fundamental asymmetry to the literature: 
with a large number of comparisons (e.g. accuracy and reaction time for 3+ object categories) 
it is easy to identify - and possibly misidentify – a potential deficit in object recognition. For 
example, Garrido, Duchaine, and DeGutis (2018) noted that 50% of control participants from 
a previous study could have been classified as having an object recognition impairment using 
Geskin and Behrmann’s criteria. On the other hand, with so many potential object categories, 
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it is also simple for authors to dismiss cases of ostensibly intact object recognition by 
claiming that the “wrong” objects have been studied.  
Further, many authors offer little justification for choosing a particular object (e.g. 
Huis in ‘t Veld, Van den Stock, & de Gelder, 2012; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015; 
Zhao et al., 2016; but see Malsapina, Albonico, Toneatto, & Daini, 2017). This has led to a 
bewildering and inconsistent range of object tests being used, which can limit comparisons 
between studies. One solution is to treat all object categories as equally valid for identifying 
potential deficits. While useful for pointing to potential associations or dissociations between 
faces and objects on a broad level, this approach can make it difficult to draw wider 
conclusions about the perceptual or cognitive origins of the disorder. Rather than object 
processing as a whole being “intact” or “impaired” in DP, it is possible that a selective deficit 
is only apparent for some object classes – for example, bodies or body parts (e.g. AP case 
FM, Moro et al., 2012; DP cases in Righart & de Gelder, 2007); or that the deficit is present 
for any stimuli that share perceptual processing demands with faces, such as a first order 
configuration and within-category discrimination (e.g. AP patient LH, de Gelder & Rouw, 
2000; DP cases in Malsapina et al., 2017). Consequently, it may be more theoretically 
informative to examine the pattern of deficits across different objects, as opposed to simply 
classifying a deficit as being present or absent.  
These shortcomings are unfortunate given the larger prevalence of DP compared to 
AP should allow the co-occurrence of object agnosia to be more systematically examined. In 
the only large-scale empirical study reported to date, Zhao et al. (2016) reported a weak 
significant correlation between face and object (flowers, cars and birds) perception in 64 DPs, 
and later categorical analysis of the dataset concluded that 40 DPs had normal object 
perception skills, seven had mild deficits, and 17 showed severe impairments (Gaskin & 
Behrmann, 2018). However, the design and difficulty of the study were not matched across 
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the face and object conditions: while the former used the faces of celebrities (thereby drawing 
on mechanisms used in familiar face recognition: Johnston & Edmonds, 2009), the object 
condition used unfamiliar exemplars for matching. Furthermore, the analysis did not 
discriminate between different types of objects, so it is not possible to determine whether the 
object recognition deficits were present across all categories, or whether different individuals 
showed different clusters of impairment. 
The review reported by Gaskin and Behrmann (2018) attempted to draw conclusions 
across all published studies, concluding that ~20% of DP cases are face-specific, and that the 
frequent association between face and object recognition supports a domain-general 
explanation of DP. However, this figure is likely to be inaccurate given that (a) over a third of 
cases were excluded as insufficient data were available, (b) there were vast differences across 
studies in the diagnostic procedures used to identify DPs, and (c) many studies failed to select 
appropriate object categories, resulting in variations in task difficulty between the face and 
object measure. In fact, when the large sample reported by Zhao and colleagues is dismissed, 
alongside another case where inappropriate methodology was used (Weiss, Mardo & Avidan, 
2016; see Campbell & Tanaka, 2018), the face-specific category only contains six individuals 
(less than 1% of the sample; but see Garrido, Duchaine & DeGutis, 2018, for a potential 
omission). However, it is very difficult to draw strong conclusions across these remaining 
cases, given different sub-processes of object recognition were tapped in each study. 
The current study assessed face- and object-processing skills in 40 DP participants, 
using a sequential same/different face and object (hands, houses) matching task. The identical 
paradigm was used across all three stimulus categories, presenting perceptually homogenous 
stimuli which required discrimination on an exemplar (as opposed to a category) level (see 
Campbell & Tanaka, 2018). We selected the two object categories for theoretical reasons. 
Hands share several perceptual characteristics with faces: they are frequently seen body parts 
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that share a first-order configuration (i.e. a specific arrangement of features common to all 
specimens); and the variability in hands is genetically driven, as opposed to experimentally 
controlled (see Crookes & McKone, 2009). There has also been substantial interest in the 
relationship between face and body processing, with some suggestion that impairments in 
face-processing arise from cognitive and neural mechanisms that are shared with body 
perception (Righart & de Gelder, 2007; but see Biotti, Gray, & Cook, 2017). Pertinently, 
neural areas associated with body perception (the extrastriate body area: Downing, Jiang, 
Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001) are responsive during the perception and discrimination of 
isolated hand stimuli (Myers & Sowden, 2008). Thus, if DPs demonstrate a deficit for body 
parts, or biological objects more generally, we would expect this to be present for hands. On 
a more practical level, hands are also commonly viewed in their natural state, whereas bodies 
are usually viewed clothed, which may affect the cues people use to recognise them. 
Furthermore, we deemed hands to be preferable to other body-related stimuli such as 
biological motion (e.g. point-light walkers; Johansson, 1973), as movement may influence 
reaction time measures (e.g. people may not be able to respond until they have seen a certain 
amount of motion; a difficulty not present for static images), making it difficult to compare 
across stimulus categories.  
Houses were selected as comparison non-biological stimuli. Our house stimuli varied 
along dimensions such as feature shape, spacing, and texture; but shared a set number of 
features and a limited range of configurations (relationships between features), to increase the 
level of structural similarity between the stimuli (see Campbell & Tanaka, 2018). This 
allowed us to examine whether any of our DP participants demonstrated more general object 
agnosia, as opposed to a more specific impairment affecting only biological stimuli.  
 
 
Matching in Prosopagnosia 8 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Forty adults with DP (22 female; age range = 18-66 years, M = 47.6, SD = 14.6) took part in 
this study. All had contacted our laboratory complaining of severe everyday difficulties with 
face recognition: these were confirmed via diagnostic protocols that are adhered to by most 
laboratories in the field (see Dalrymple & Palermo, 2016; Murray, Hills, Bennetts & Bate, 
2018). In brief, all individuals performed significantly below published age-matched control 
cut-offs on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; for cut-
offs see Bowles et al., 2009) and a famous faces test (Bate, Adams, Bennetts & Line, in 
press). Each case’s scores on these tests are presented as supplementary information (see 
SM1), in addition to individual scores on the upright trials of the Cambridge Face Perception 
Test (CFPT; Duchaine et al., 2007). Because face perception can sometimes be preserved in 
DP, CFPT scores are typically not used as an absolute diagnostic criterion (Bate & Tree, 
2017; Dalrymple & Palermo, 2016), and are not regarded as such in the current study. 
No individual reported a history of socio-emotional, psychiatric or neurological 
disorder. Concurrent socio-emotional disorder was also excluded using the Autism Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer & Wheelwright, 2006), and cognitive decline in those 
aged 65+ (using the Mini Mental State Examination: Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). 
Participants were screened for lower-level perceptual impairments: basic visual acuity was 
assessed using a standard Snellen letter chart (3 m), the Hamilton-Veale contrast sensitivity 
test, and four sub-tests of the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Line Match, Size 
Match, Orientation Match; Position of the Gap Match; Humphreys & Riddoch, 1993). No 
participant showed any impairment. 
A total of 60 control participants (30 male) also took part in this study, IQ-matched to 
the DP sample (using the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading, Holdnack, 2001). Because of the 
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varied age in the DP sample, controls were recruited according to two separate age-groups, 
each containing 30 (15 female) participants. As previous work has indicated small 
improvements in face recognition until the age of 30 (Germine, Duchaine & Nakayama, 
2011), followed by consistency until the age of 50 (e.g. Bowles et al., 2009), the younger 
group were aged 20-49 years (M = 32.9, SD = 9.1), and the older group 50-66 years (M = 
57.0, SD = 4.6). Controls were recruited from the departmental participant pool, and received 
a small financial payment in exchange for their time. They underwent the same perceptual 
and socio-emotional screening procedures as described for the DP group, and no individual 
reported everyday difficulties in face recognition. Ethical approval for this experiment was 
granted by the institutional Ethics Committee, and all participants provided informed consent 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
2.2. Materials and procedure 
A sequential same/different face and object (hand/houses) matching task, that displayed 
stimuli in upright and inverted conditions, was created within our laboratory and has been 
used in our previous work (Bobak et al., 2016). Existing analyses on control data found a 
clear inversion effect for faces but not hands nor houses (Bobak et al., 2016), indicating the 
test is suitable for the assessment of differences in the processing of faces versus objects. 
Further, as the task restricts the length of time that initial images are displayed, DPs were 
unlikely to use laboured compensatory strategies to achieve correct responses. Nevertheless, 
both accuracy and reaction time were monitored (see below). 
Test trials consisted of two sequentially presented images (see Figure 1) – the initial 
study image was displayed for 250 msec, and the second test image was displayed until the 
participant responded. The images were separated by a 1000 msec ISI (a fixation cross 
displayed in the centre of the screen). In the face condition, the study image showed a face 
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from a frontal viewpoint and the test image from a 30-45° angle. Faces were drawn from the 
Cambridge Face Memory Test-Australian (McKone et al., 2011) and the Bosphorous Face 
Database (Savran et al., 2008), and were edited to remove external features. Images were 
paired so that the target and distractor images for each test face were taken from the same 
database (to minimise differences in contrast and luminance), and presented the faces at the 
same angle. Houses were created using the software Realtime Landscaping Plus (Idea 
Spectrum Inc., 2012). Each house contained the same number of features (three sets of 
windows and a door), placed onto a constant background texture. The shape and exact 
location of the features, the background (building) texture, and the overall shape of the house 
varied throughout the set. As in the face condition, the study and test images presented the 
houses from two different viewpoints (frontal and 15° profile). To prevent matching based on 
low-level image characteristics such as the background colour of the houses (which was 
varied slightly throughout the stimulus set), the brightness of the test images was reduced by 
30% using Adobe Photoshop. Hand images were extracted from the Bosphorus Hand 
Database (Dutagaci, Yoruk, & Sankur, 2008), and showed the palm and fingers of a hand. 
Images were chosen to exclude rings, watches, cuffs or other identifying features. Study and 
test images showed the hands in two different positions (e.g. fingers slightly splayed and 
fingers together), with the fingers pointing upwards (upright condition) or downwards 
(inverted condition). To prevent low-level image matching, the test images were processed 
further in Adobe Photoshop – the brightness was reduced by 30%, and a mosaic filter was 
applied with a cell size of 3 squares (resulting in a slightly pixelated image). Across all 
conditions, the stimuli were resized to measure approximately 8cm across when displayed 
on-screen, subtending roughly 10 degrees of visual angle when participants were seated at a 
comfortable distance from the monitor (50-60cm). 
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Each category contained 32 pairs of images (16 same identities, 16 different 
identities). All pairs were presented twice upright and twice inverted. Trials were blocked by 
stimulus type, with upright and inverted trials presented randomly within each stimulus type. 
The order of blocks was randomised between participants, and they were required to indicate 
whether the two images showed the same or different faces or objects by pressing the z and m 
keys on the keyboard (assignment of keys was counterbalanced between participants). 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
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2.3. Statistical analyses 
Because this task contained matching and mis-matching trials, we initially calculated the 
proportion of hits (correctly identifying that two images matched in identity) and correct 
rejections (correctly identifying that two images do not match in identity) that each 
participant made in each condition. We also went beyond existing work by examining 
accuracy independently of response bias, computing signal detection theory (SDT) measures 
of sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) for each participant. d’ incorporates information from hits and 
false positives to create a measure of sensitivity that is free from the influence of response 
bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). A score of 0 indicates chance performance: values for 
the current test can range from -4.59 (consistently incorrect responding) to 4.59 (perfect 
accuracy). The measure c is used as an indicator of response bias (i.e. whether the participant 
has a tendency to say that the images do or do not match; MacMillan & Creelman, 2005). A 
score of 0 indicates a neutral response criterion, whereas a positive score indicates 
conservative responding (a tendency to indicate that a stimuli were not the same) and a 
negative score indicates more liberal responding (a tendency to indicate that the stimuli were 
the same). Prior to calculation of the SDT measures, extreme hit and correct rejection scores 
(1 and 0) were adjusted by replacing them with (n - 0.5)/n and 0.5/n respectively (when n 
indicates number of possible hits or false alarms; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). We also 
calculated mean response latencies for correct responses in each condition. Any reaction 
times that exceeded three SDs from each participant’s mean response latency were excluded. 
Overall patterns of performance in the control participants were initially carried out to 
assess the calibration of each condition was equal in difficulty. Subsequently, we compared 
DP to control performance in group-based analyses. Our remaining analyses focused solely 
on the DP group, beginning with a factor analysis on the overall data. Next, we took a 
categorical case-by-case approach to partitioning the data. Because it is well known that DP 
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is heterogenous in its presentation, we expected a varying pattern of performance, even in the 
upright faces condition. Deficits in face perception are only sometimes observed in DP (e.g. 
Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2012; Palermo et al., 2011), and given the nature of our task (i.e. a 
sequential matching task), it is possible that some individuals may be able to achieve typical 
patterns of performance. However, as typical accuracy scores are sometimes associated with 
atypically long response latencies (see discussion above), we wanted to be conservative in 
identifying any potential cases of preserved performance. Because face inversion effects are 
often used as an indicator of typical face-processing strategies (Farah, Tanaka & Drain, 1995; 
Yin, 1969), and support for domain-specificity comes from findings of larger inversion 
effects for faces than objects (Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002; Yin, 1969), our 
categorization criteria for preserved performance in the faces condition therefore required a 
typical face inversion effect, in addition to typical accuracy and reaction time. 
Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2005) Bayesian Standardized Difference Test (SDT) was 
used to estimate whether each individual’s standardized difference between face and object 
performance differed from the standardized difference observed in the control sample. 
Significant differences were sub-divided into strong (where the participant displays impaired 
scores on both tests) versus classic (where one score is impaired and one is intact) 
dissociations (Shallice, 1988). This is theoretically important: evidence of the latter suggests 
a qualitative difference between face and object processing (i.e. evidence of domain-
specificity), whereas the former suggests only a quantitative difference, implying a reliance 
on related mechanisms and/or an association between impairments that affect different 
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3. Results 
3.1. Control patterns of performance 
Initially, we examined overall patterns of performance in the control group only, to determine 
whether the face and object matching conditions were appropriately matched for difficulty. 
Subsequently, we examined overall patterns of performance in the two participant groups, to 
ensure there were no unusual patterns of results which might affect our later analyses (e.g. 
unusual inversion effects; extreme differences in bias across conditions). For brevity, only 
significant interactions and main effects are reported (all ps > .05 for non-significant results). 
The Huynh-Feldt correction is applied where relevant, and multiple comparisons are 
Bonferroni corrected.  
The d’ and reaction time data for the control group was entered into a 3 (stimulus 
category: faces, hands, houses) x 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) repeated measures 
ANCOVA, with participant age as a covariate. The ANCOVA on d’ revealed that the main 
effect of stimulus was significant, F(2,116) = 98.72, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .630, as was the main 
effect of orientation, F(1,58) = 11.55, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .571, and the interaction between 
stimulus and orientation, F(1.90,110.01) = 28.18, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .33. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that houses were discriminated significantly better than hands and faces, in both the 
upright and inverted conditions; hands were discriminated also discriminated better than 
faces in the inverted condition (all ps < .0005). There was no significant difference between 
faces and hands in the upright condition, p > .1.  
The ANCOVA on reaction time revealed that the main effect of orientation was 
significant, F(1,58) = 15.29, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .209, as was the interaction between stimulus 
and orientation, F(1.74,101.10) = 13.38, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .187. The main effect of stimulus 
was not significant, F(2,116) = 1.62, p = .203. Pairwise comparisons indicated that there were 
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no significant differences between reaction times to upright stimuli; however, inverted faces 
were matched significantly slower than inverted hands or houses, p’s < .02.  
From these analyses, it is apparent that control participants were significantly better at 
matching the house stimuli, compared to the faces and hand stimuli. Consequently, we 
conducted a materials analysis to equate the difficulty levels of the different stimulus types. 
We used a median split based on accuracy to separate the upright house trials into two groups 
(separately for “same” and “different” trials), and those in the top half were removed from the 
analysis. The matched trials (i.e., those using the same stimuli) were removed from the 
inverted condition. This allowed us to preserve the match between upright and inverted 
stimuli, as well as the balance of same and different trials across conditions. Given that each 
trial was repeated twice in the experiment, this resulted in 16 trials per condition being 
entered into the analysis for the house stimuli. As the face and hand stimuli were well-
matched for difficulty in the upright condition, they did not undergo any adjustment. 
Subsequent to the adjustment, follow-up analyses revealed that there was no longer a 
significant difference in performance between upright faces, houses, and hands in the control 
group (all p’s > 0.1). 
 
3.2. Group-based analyses: DPs versus controls 
For d’, c and reaction time, data were entered into a 2 (participant group: DP, control) x 3 
(stimulus category: faces, hands, houses) x 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) mixed factorial 
ANCOVA, with participant age as a covariate. A further analysis also included the proportion 
of hits and correct rejections (trial type) as an additional factor.  
d’ (sensitivity): The ANCOVA revealed significant two-way interactions for stimulus 
and participant group, F(1.90,184.72) = 6.22, p = .003, ηρ2 = .060, orientation and participant 
group, F(1,97) = 3.93, p = .050, ηρ2 = .039; and orientation and stimulus, F(2,194) = 27.44, p 
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< .0005, ηρ2 = .221 (see Figure 2). The three-way interaction was not significant. Follow-up 
analyses confirmed that DPs performed significantly worse than controls when matching 
faces (p < .0005), but not hands or houses (ps > .05). Averaged across stimuli, DPs also 
performed significantly worse than controls in upright trials (p = .001), but not inverted trials 
(p = .098).  Across groups, there was a significant inversion effect for faces (p < .0005) and 
hands (p = .010), but not houses (p = .914).  
  These interactions superseded main effects of participant group (where controls 
outperformed DPs: F(1,97) = 7.46, p = .008, ηρ2 = .071), orientation (where upright stimuli 
were recognized more accurately than inverted: F(1,97) = 47.88, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .330), and 
stimulus (houses were recognized more accurately than faces or hands, and hands more 
accurately than faces; all ps <.001), F(1.90,184.72) = 66.61, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .407. 
 
Figure 2: Estimated marginal means of d’ scores for control and DP participants, controlling 



















Matching in Prosopagnosia 17 
Hits and correct rejections: The four-way interaction was not significant, nor were 
any of the three-way interactions involving participant group (see Figure 3). There was a 
three-way interaction between stimulus, orientation, and trial type, F(2,194) = 13.82, p < 
.0005, ηρ2 = .125; reflecting an inversion effect for correct rejections of faces (p < .0005), but 
not houses or hands (ps > .1); but no inversion effect for hits for any stimulus (ps > .15).  
All of the two-way interactions involving stimulus were significant. The interaction 
between stimulus and orientation, F(2,194) = 27.85, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .223, reflected a 
significant inversion effect for faces and hands (p’s < .05) but not houses (p = .891). The 
interaction between stimulus and trial type, F(1.89,182.92) = 38.26, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .283, 
reflected the fact that there were significant differences between stimulus categories in the 
upright trials (faces less than hands and houses, hands less than houses, all p’s < .01), but not 
in the inverted trials (p’s > .25). The interaction between stimulus and participant group, 
F(1.90,184.29) = 7.00, p =.001, ηρ2 = .067, reflected a significant difference between DPs 
and controls in the faces condition (p < .0005, DPs < controls), but not the houses or hands 
conditions (p’s > .05). 
There was also a significant interaction between orientation and trial type, F(1,97) = 
7.44, p = .008, ηρ2 = .071: the inversion effect for hits was not significant (p = .059), whereas 
it was for CRs (p < .0005). The interaction between orientation and participant group, F(1,97) 
= 7.50, p = .007, ηρ2 = .072 also reached significance, reflecting a significant difference 
between controls and DPs in upright trials (p < .0005) but not inverted trials (p = 0.91).  
Unsurprisingly, there were main effects of participant group and orientation, F(1,97) = 8.40, 
p = .005, ηρ2 = .080, and F(1,97) = 61.54, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .388, respectively. A main effect 
of stimulus, F(1.90,184.29) = 65.65, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .404, was underpinned by better 
performance for houses and hands compared to faces (ps < .0005), and better performance for 
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houses than hands (p = .004). A main effect of trial type, F(1,97) = 24.14, p < .0005, ηρ2 = 
.199 reflected better performance in “same” trials (hits) than “different” trials (CRs).  
 
Figure 3: Estimated marginal means of a) hits and b) correct rejections for control and DP 
participants, controlling for age. Error bars represent +/-1 SEM 
 
 
c (bias): The three-way interaction was non-significant, as was the two-way 
interaction between participant group and stimulus. There was a significant interaction 
between participant group and orientation, F(1,97) = 4.26, p = .042, ηρ2 = .042. Control 
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participants showed a more conservative response bias for upright than inverted stimuli (p < 
.0005), whereas DPs showed no effect of inversion on bias (p = .736). There was also a 
significant interaction between stimulus and orientation, F(2,194) = 14.92, p < .0005, ηρ2 = 
.133; there was a significant difference in response bias between upright and inverted faces (p 
< .0005), with upright faces eliciting more conservative responses than inverted faces; 
however, there was no significant difference in response bias for upright and inverted hands 
and houses (p’s > .3). In addition to the interactions, there were main effects of orientation 
(responses for upright stimuli were more conservative than for inverted: F(1,97) = 6.74, p = 
.011, ηρ2 = .065) and stimulus, F(1.90, 18.37) = 40.90, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .297: responses were 
more conservative for faces than hands or houses (ps < .0005), but no difference between the 
latter (p = .390). The main effect of participant group was not significant.  
Reaction time: The three-way interaction was not significant; nor were the two-way 
interactions involving participant group, or the main effect of stimulus (see Figure 4). There 
was a significant main effect of orientation (upright stimuli were matched faster than inverted 
stimuli: F(1,97) = 6.76, p = .011, ηρ2 = .065) and an interaction between stimulus and 
orientation, F(2,194) = 9.50, p < .0005, ηρ2 = .089. Pairwise comparisons revealed that there 
was a significant inversion effect for faces (p < .0005), but not hands or houses (p’s > .2). 
The main effect of participant group was also significant, F(1, 97) = 9.34, p = .003, ηρ2 = 
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Figure 4: Estimated marginal means of reaction time for control and DP participants, 
controlling for age. Error bars represent +/-1 SEM 
 
 
3.3. DPS: Overall patterns of performance 
Despite our limited sample size (N = 40), the DP group’s d’ scores were entered into a 
principal components analysis (PCA). Initial eigenvalues indicated that the first two factors 
explained 48.48% and 17.35% of the variance, and the remaining four factors had 
eigenvalues that were less than one. Solutions for two, three, four and five factors were each 
examined using varimax and oblimin rotations of the factor loading matrix. The three factor 
varimax solution (which explained 78.46% of the variance) was preferred, as it offered the 
best defined factor structure (see Table 1). The first factor had high loadings from upright and 
inverted performance on hands and houses. The second factor had high loadings from the 
inverted faces and upright and inverted hands conditions. The final factor had a very high 
loading from the upright faces condition, and a small loading from inverted hands. No 
significant correlations were observed between upright faces and any other condition, 
whereas moderate-to-strong correlations were observed between the four object conditions 
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Table 1: Varimax rotated component loadings for DPs’ upright and inverted d’ scores for 
faces, hands and houses (values < .3 are suppressed). 
Component 1 2 3 
Upright faces   .96 
Inverted faces  .94  
Upright hands .60 .59  
Inverted hands .70 .31 .37 
Upright houses .88   
Inverted hands .76   
  
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for d’ scores for DP participants for upright (U) and inverted (I) 
conditions. 
 Faces U Faces I Hands U Hands I Houses U Houses I 
Faces U 1 .05 .17 .33 .29 .18 
Faces I  1 .47* .30 .17 .31 
Hands U   1 .65** .49** .43* 
Hands I    1 .64** .38* 
Houses U     1 .53** 
Houses I      1 
*p < .006; **p < .001 (Holm’s sequential Bonferroni correction applied) 
 
3.4. DPs: Face matching 
Because we adopted a sequential matching task, it is unclear whether this task draws more 
heavily on perceptual or short-term memory mechanisms. To explore this issue, we carried 
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out a PCA (using Varimax rotation) on the DP group’s CFMT and CFPT scores (upright 
trials only, see SM1; note that CFPT scores were transformed into proportion correct, rather 
than raw number of errors), and their d’ scores from the upright faces condition of the 
matching task. Two factors emerged that had eigenvalues that were greater than one. The first 
explained 40.81% of the variance, and had high loadings from the CFPT and the matching 
task (see Table 3). The second factor explained a further 36.01% of the variance, and had a 
very high loading from the CFMT. 
We then took a categorical approach to partitioning performance according to intact 
and impaired face matching performance. Seventeen DPs (eight male; M age = 33.3 years, 
SD = 10.4) were compared to the younger control group, and 23 (13 female; M age = 58.1 
years, SD = 5.0) to the older group (see Table 4). Twenty-five out of the 40 DPs (62.5%) 
displayed intact face matching performance, judged by performance that was within 1.96 SDs 
of the control mean for both d’ and reaction time in the upright faces condition, and the d’ 
and reaction time face inversion effects. Of the 15 DPs who displayed impaired performance, 
eight only showed atypical d’ scores, four only showed atypical reaction times, and two were 
impaired on both measures. One further participant achieved an impaired d’ score, and their 
reaction times were significantly quicker than those of control participants. 
 
Table 3: Varimax rotated component loadings for DPs’ CFMT and upright CFPT scores, 
together with d’ scores for the upright faces condition in the matching task (values < .3 are 
suppressed). 
Component 1 2 
CFMT  .92 
CFPT .75 .39 
Upright faces matching .81  
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Table 4: Mean (SD) upright (U) and inverted (I) d’ and reaction time (RT) performance for 
younger and older controls in each condition, with the inversion effect (IE) for faces. 
1  Faces Hands Houses 
U I IE U I U I 




























































3.5. DPs: Domain-Specificity 
We then examined the proportion of DPs who showed domain-specificity within the two face 
matching groups (i.e. impaired and preserved). The same criteria were used to judge intact 
object matching skills as were used for face matching (see above): performance was required 
to be within 1.96 SDs of the relevant control mean on both d’ and reaction time, in all object 
categories. We included both the inverted as well as the upright conditions in these criteria as 
it is debateable which orientation is truly “upright” for hands; as we subsequently did not 
want to imbalance the number of criterion conditions for hands versus houses, we also 
included the inverted houses condition. Note that we did not look at inversion effects for 
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hands and houses as they are typically absent or reduced for objects (and were absent in our 
overall ANCOVAs).  
Of the 25 DPs who showed typical face matching performance, eight achieved a z 
score that was within the impaired range in at least one object category (two were impaired 
across both categories, four only at houses, and two only at hands). SDTs confirmed classical 
dissociations (intact face but impaired object matching) in three individuals, all affecting only 
the matching of hands (see “reverse” dissociations in Table 5). 
The remaining 15 DPs were within the “impaired face matching” category. Nine 
demonstrated intact object matching in all conditions. SDTs revealed significant dissociations 
between face and object matching in nine of the 15 DPs (see Table 5): six displayed classic 
dissociations (impaired face matching but typical object matching) and three displayed strong 
dissociations (impaired scores in both conditions). Of the latter three, one had impairments 
that affected both hands and houses, whereas two had impairments that were restricted to 
hands (see Table 5 for SDT results; see Figure 5 for Z-scores for all of the DPs who showed 
significant dissociations).  
The proportion of DPs that fell into the intact and impaired face matching categories 
is displayed in Figure 6 as a function of confirmed dissociations with object matching. A Chi-
Square analysis indicated a significant difference in the pattern of dissociation observed in 
each group, Χ2 = 10.29, p = .001. Unsurprisingly, when face matching skills were spared, 
object matching skills were much more likely (7.3 times) to be unaffected than impaired. 
More interestingly, when face matching skills were impaired, object matching skills were 
dissociated in nine out of 15 individuals (including six classical dissociations).  
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Figure 5: Summary of standardized scores for all DPs who showed significant dissociations 
between face and object recognition. Top panels show standardized d’ scores for DPs who 
showed a) classic dissociations; and b) strong (grey lines) and reverse (black lines) 
dissociations. Bottom panels show standardized RT for DPs who showed c) classic 
dissociations; and d) strong (grey lines) and reverse (black lines).  
 
 
Figure 6: The proportion of DPs that fell into the intact and impaired face perception 
categories, as a function of confirmed dissociations with object perception. 
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Table 5: The results of Bayesian Standardized Difference Tests that confirmed dissociations between performance in the upright faces condition 
compared to the upright (U) and inverted (I) hands and houses conditions. Reported statistics represent t values; the estimated percentage of the 
control population exhibiting a difference more extreme than the individual is presented in parentheses. 
 d’ Reaction Time 
U hands U houses I hands I houses U hands U houses I hands I houses 
Classic:         
DP10-AG 1.16 (12.82) 2.69 (0.58)* 2.48 (0.96) 1.64 (5.57) 2.06 (2.43) 3.03 (0.26)* 2.26 (1.57) 3.38 (0.10)* 
DP12-KR 2.57 (0.78)* 2.99 (0.28)* 2.55 (0.82)* 1.95 (3.02) 12.41 (0.01)** 12.78 (0.01)** 10.21 (0.01)** 12.78 (0.01)** 
DP13-HF 2.56 (0.79)* 2.47 (0.97)* 1.71 (4.86) 4.07 (0.02)** 1.03 (15.56) 0.39 (35.00) 0.90 (18.85) 0.35 (36.30) 
DP17-ID 2.90 (0.35)* 1.76 (4.43) 1.93 (3.20) 1.69 (5.13) 2.68 (0.60)* 2.00 (2.74) 2.19 (1.85) 1.95 (3.03) 
DP32-WS 2.89 (0.36)* 2.05 (2.50)* 3.48 (0.08)* 3.25 (0.15)* 0.17 (43.47) 0.71 (24.04) 0.43 (33.60) 0.06 (47.66) 
DP35KCJ 4.30 (0.01)** 3.15 (0.19)* 3.42 (0.09)* 3.56 (0.07)** 0.34 (36.87) 0.87 (19.53) 0.15 (44.13) 0.58 (28.28) 
Strong:         
DP07-VO 0.72 (23.80) 0.15 (44.07) 0.29 (38.56) 0.93 (17.98) 2.22 (1.73) 2.67 (0.06)* 1.41 (8.46) 3.40 (0.10)* 
DP15-PF 2.53 (0.85)* 1.67 (5.33) 2.00 (2.76) 3.09 (0.22)* 2.45 (1.04) 0.73 (23.63) 2.06 (2.40) 0.53 (30.07) 
DP25-MW 1.59 (6.17) 0.41 (34.37) 1.32 (9.93) 0.09 (46.28) 8.10 (0.01)** 7.85 (0.01**) 9.40 (0.01)** 6.24 (0.01)** 
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Reverse:         
DP29-C22 0.67 (25.56) 0.69 (24.66) 0.50 (31.18) 0.63 (26.79) 3.97 (0.02)** 2.41 (1.13) 0.14 (44.58) 0.49 (31.51) 
DP31-CE 0.13 (44.93) 1.58 (6.24) 0.89 (19.06) 1.61 (5.92) 6.52 (0.01)** 1.94 (3.09) 0.73 (23.50) 1.00 (16.32) 
DP36-JP 1.08 (14.39) 1.28 (10.56) 0.64 (26.35) 1.14 (13.27) 5.17 (0.01)** 0.45 (32.73) 3.73 (0.04)** 0.06 (47.74) 
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3.6. DPs: Hands versus houses 
Finally, we examined the specific patterns of object recognition deficits displayed by DPs.  
Fourteen individuals (eight with intact face matching) achieved at least one z score that was 
below 1.96 SDs of the control mean across the object conditions. Both hands and houses 
were affected in five DPs (three of these also showed face matching impairments), just hands 
in four (two with a face matching impairment), and just houses in five (one with impaired 
face matching skills).  Fishers Exact test indicated that there was not a significant difference 
in the distribution of object impairments for DPs with intact and impaired face matching 
skills (p = .577). In other words, there was no significant association between the presence or 
absence of face perception deficits and the presence of a specific pattern of object perception 
deficits.  
When examining the group of DPs with confirmed dissociations between face and 
object matching (12 individuals, see Table 5), six of the nine participants that presented with 
impaired face matching (listed as “Classic” and “Strong” dissociations in Table 5) displayed 
a dissociation for faces versus both hands and houses. Two individuals showed dissociations 
(one classic) between face and house matching, and one showed a classic dissociation 
between face and hand matching. The three remaining individuals showed dissociations 
between intact face matching and impaired object matching (all hands only; denoted as 
“Reverse” in Table 5). 
We then screened the entire DP group for dissociations between performance in the 
hands and houses conditions, using SDTs. We compared performance in the upright houses 
condition to those of both upright and inverted hands (we included both hands condition 
given there is not a clear “upright” condition for this category; see Table 6). One individual 
(DP15), who had showed strong dissociations between face matching and both categories of 
objects, also showed a classic dissociation between impaired hand matching and intact house 
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matching. One further DP (DP23) who was impaired at face matching, but did not dissociate 
from object matching, showed a classic dissociation between impaired house matching and 
intact hand matching. An additional participant (DP36) who was not impaired at face 
matching showed a classic dissociation between house and hand matching (hands impaired). 
Strong dissociations between house and hand matching were observed in two additional 
participants (DP29 and DP31) who did not present with face matching impairments. 
 
Table 6: The results of Bayesian Standardized Difference Tests that confirmed dissociations 
between performance in the upright houses condition compared to the upright and inverted 
hands conditions. Reported statistics represent t values; the estimated percentage of the 








 Upright hands Inverted hands Upright hands Inverted hands 
Classic:      
DP15 (PF) Yes 0.52 (30.45) 0.16 (43.88) 2.64 (0.66)* 2.49 (0.94)* 
DP23(C20PA) Yes 2.92 (0.33)* 2.52 (0.88)* 1.86 (3.63) 0.86 (19.75) 
DP36 (JP) No 0.43 (33.42) 1.01 (16.13) 3.65 (0.05)** 2.62 (0.69)* 
Strong:      
DP29 (C22) No 0.15 (44.16) 0.36 (36.14) 0.50 (31.13) 2.50 (0.91)* 
DP31 (CE) No 1.89 (3.42) 1.12 (13.58) 3.12 (0.20)* 1.50 (7.18) 
**p < .001; *p < .05 (Holm’s sequential Bonferroni correction applied) 
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4. Discussion 
This investigation set out to examine the domain-specificity of face matching skills in a large 
sample of DP participants. The findings support domain-specificity: while significant 
correlations emerged between all of the four object categories, no condition correlated with 
performance in the upright faces condition, and a PCA revealed separate factors for upright 
face perception and object perception. Further, a categorical analysis demonstrated that, when 
face matching was impaired, object matching skills were classically dissociated in six out of 
15 individuals. There was evidence of dissociation between face and object matching in one 
third of the 40 DP cases (including individuals with both intact and impaired face matching), 
and in many cases (20% of the overall group), this dissociation appeared across multiple 
object categories.  
Importantly, evidence for domain-specificity has emerged in both group and case-by-
case analyses. At the group-level, the performance of the DP group on the upright faces 
condition did not correlate with any other condition, despite moderate-to-high correlations 
between the four object conditions. This pattern of findings indicates that face and object 
matching deficits do not tend to associate according to their severity, and is backed up by 
evidence of statistical dissociations in some of the DP cases. Unsurprisingly, we found that, 
when face matching skills are intact, object matching skills also tend to be unaffected. 
However, when face matching skills were impaired, classical dissociations were noted in just 
over one third of the participants. This is a higher proportion to the 20% figure reported by 
Gaskin and Behrmann (2018), and has the potential to substantially increase if any of our DPs 
who showed typical face and object matching performance go on to show domain-specific 
impairments in memory paradigms. Importantly, the larger figure in our study emerged 
despite the fact that Geskin and Behrmann drew conclusions across studies that used a wide 
variety of paradigms and initial inclusion criteria. Further, they used z scores alone to deem 
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intact or impaired performance, whereas an advantage of the current work is that we 
confirmed dissociations via conservative SDTs that account for the correlation of 
performance in control participants. Thus, while the current findings more rigorously assess 
domain-specificity in DP, they return greater support for domain-specificity than the more 
liberal criteria used by Geskin and Behrmann. 
Placing proportions aside, the patterns of dissociation are of greater theoretical 
interest, particularly in the six individuals who demonstrated classical dissociations in their 
face matching impairments. Importantly, we are confident that these individuals genuinely 
fulfil the criteria for DP due to our stringent inclusion criteria. Further, our criteria for 
deeming typical face and object matching was mostly identical (although we also required 
evidence of a normal face inversion effect for the former): participants had to display typical 
performance on both d’ and reaction time measures. While the individuals in the “impaired 
face matching group” achieved a range of z scores in the upright faces condition, four scored 
at least three SDs lower than the relevant control mean on d’, and four on reaction time. Thus, 
we can be confident that face matching was not just borderline-impaired in these individuals. 
Conversely, some of these DPs consistently achieved positive z scores across the object 
conditions. While two individuals only displayed the dissociation for one object condition, 
evidence was more consistent in the remaining four. This indicates a potential qualitative 
difference in processing between faces and other body parts, and between faces and other 
objects which show a high degree of structural similarity. The finding is particularly notable 
since the object categories were chosen to maximise the potential overlap between face and 
object processing. As such, our results provide convincing statistical support (backed up by 
careful methodology) for domain-specificity in at least four individuals. Pertinently, evidence 
for the double dissociation was also observed in three DPs who showed intact face matching 
but impaired object matching. While this finding is surprising, it is likely that individual 
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differences exist for all kinds of biological categories of stimuli, and category-specific 
'agnosia' may be found in a small percentage of people. Nevertheless, the dissociation only 
emerged in one or two comparisons in each individual, and would need replication before 
further comment. 
There is also evidence to suggest more complex patterns of object recognition skills in 
DP. The results from the PCA indicated that hand and house perception loaded onto the same 
factor, suggesting some shared processing mechanisms across the two object categories. 
However, the DPs showed a relatively heterogeneous pattern of object matching impairments 
(a mix of hand only, house only, and multiple object deficits), which argues against a single 
common deficit underlying all cases of DP (e.g. Geskin & Behrmann, 2018). In support of 
this, some participants also demonstrated a dissociation between hand and house perception. 
Notably, this dissociation was seen in participants with and without face matching deficits, 
and in the presence and absence of dissociations between face and object recognition, 
suggesting it is not necessarily linked with the core face recognition deficit in DP. This is in 
line with recent work that has argued against a simple, single mechanism explanation for DP: 
for instance, Biotti, Gray and Cook (2017) found little relationship between the perception of 
cars and bodies in their DP participants, although both correlated with performance in the 
face condition. The authors suggest that such variations in object recognition skills may 
indicate co-occurrence of different developmental conditions, rather than damage to a 
common underpinning mechanism. The extent to which object categories may be partitioned 
under this account remains to be seen, although other studies have presented evidence of 
varied performance for different non-biological classes of object (e.g. Dalrymple, Elison & 
Duchaine, 2017). While future work should employ further classes of biological and non-
biological categories to explore this point, it remains imperative that selection of such 
categories remain theoretical-driven and appropriately comparable to faces. 
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A secondary point of interest from this investigation concerns the wide variation in 
performance on the upright faces condition. While it is unsurprising to see this heterogeneity, 
it is difficult to interpret what this variance actually represents. Indeed, the matching 
paradigm is likely to draw on both short-term memory and perceptual mechanisms, although 
it is notable that performance in the upright faces condition loaded heavily on the same factor 
as the CFPT in our PCA. Further, our finding that 62.5% of the 40 DPs met criteria for 
“typical” face matching performance is nearly identical to the proportion of DPs (from a 
sample of 16) reported to have intact face perception skills by Dalrymple and colleagues 
(2014). In line with Dalrymple et al.’s (2014) work, we used a conservative criterion for 
classifying DPs into the “intact” category: not only did we take performance that was within 
the typical range on both SDT and reaction time measures, but we also used the face 
inversion effect to indicate typical face-specific processing. In addition, our use of SDT 
enabled us to be confident that any individual scored within the typical range because they 
genuinely recognised the stimuli, and not as a result of response bias. Finally, given that our 
inclusion protocols ensured that all our DP participants had typical lower-level vision, the 
differing patterns of performance on the matching paradigm suggests that higher-order 
perceptual processes are being tapped, without placing demands on long-term face memory 
(given this is known to be impaired in the entire DP group). 
While these findings suggest a distinction between two different types of DP, further 
exploration is needed to ascertain whether this maps exactly onto the apperceptive/associative 
sub-division proposed for AP (e.g. De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991). 
Neverthless, the current findings are important, given most existing evidence supporting 
impaired (e.g. Bate & Cook, 2012; Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2012; Duchaine et al., 2007; 
Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; Palermo et al., 2011; Yovel & Duchaine, 2006) or intact 
(Behrmann et al., 2005; Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2012; McKone et al., 2011; Palermo et al., 
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2011) face perception skills in DP have failed to take both accuracy and reaction time into 
account (but see Dalrymple, Garrido & Duchaine, 2014; Ulrich et al., 2017). Furthermore, no 
known study has examined the face-specificity of different patterns of perceptual skills in DP, 
and to date, most of the debates around domain-specificity have not distinguished between 
mnemonic and perceptual deficits (see Barton, 2018). This is an important theoretical issue as 
the face-specificity of apperceptive compared to associative prosopagnosia in AP is unclear, 
and some authors believe that the former is indicative of a more general form of visual 
agnosia, while associative prosopagnosia represents a category-specific impairment of 
semantic memory (De Renzi et al., 1991; Benton & Tranel, 1993). Thus, the pattern of 
dissociations reported here presents novel evidence supporting the existence of different 
functional subtypes in DP. 
In sum, the work presented here provides timely new evidence for domain-specificity 
in DP. As a recent review and associated commentaries (see the editorial by Susilo, 2018) 
called all existing evidence on this issue into potential disregard, the careful methodology and 
analysis adopted here present a new starting point for the field. Importantly, findings suggest 
domain-specificity in six out of 15 DPs who were impaired at face matching. Future work 
should consider whether these figures hold across different measures of face and object 
perception, and whether the evidence for domain-specificity extends to memory paradigms. 
Future screening and remediation programmes may need to account for these emerging 
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Supplementary Material 1 
 
Age and gender for each individual DP participant, together with standardized scores for 
performance on the CFMT (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), CFPT (Duchaine et al., 2007) and 
a famous faces test that was created within our laboratory. Cut-offs are set at two SDs from 
the relevant control mean (note that the CFPT scores the number of errors, hence positive z-
scores indicate poorer performance). CFMT and CFPT norms are taken from the relevant 
publications. Two age-appropriate versions of the famous faces test were created: one 
contained celebrities familiar to the 18-35 year-old age group, and one for the 36+ age group. 
Norming data were collected from 25 individuals aged18-35 years (12 female; M age = 25.0 
years, SD = 4.5) and 55 participants aged 36-65 years (26 female, M age = 48.6 years, SD = 
9.2), and cut-offs for the younger (M score = 94.21, SD = 7.72) and older (M score = 93.10, 
SD = 6.28) age-groups were also set at 2 SDs from the mean. Following most laboratories in 
the field (see Dalrymple & Palermo, 2015), DP was diagnosed when impairment was 
detected on any two of the three tests. 
 
 Age Gender CFMT CFPT Famous 
Faces 
DP01 18 M -2.32 0.27 -4.22 
DP02 19 F -2.71 1.58 -4.92 
DP03 21 M -3.50 3.22 -4.74 
DP04 22 F -2.58 1.75 -2.13 
DP05 24 M -2.58 1.91 -3.78 
DP06 26 F -2.58 1.25 -6.07 
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DP07 29 F -3.50 0.93 -7.17 
DP08 32 M -2.71 0.43 -3.78 
DP09 34 M -3.11 1.34 -5.51 
DP10 37 F -3.50 2.40 -7.00 
DP11 37 M -3.63 4.53 -6.86 
DP12 37 F -2.71 0.11 -14.81 
DP13 43 F -3.89 2.07 -5.49 
DP14 46 F -3.24 2.40 -11.84 
DP15 46 F -3.63 3.55 -11.33 
DP16 46 M -2.84 2.89 -5.00 
DP17 49 M -2.71 4.86 -3.09 
DP18 50 F -4.03 2.07 -7.39 
DP19 52 M -3.50 1.42 -9.88 
DP20 52 F -2.97 1.09 -5.11 
DP21 53 F -2.32 0.93 -8.82 
DP22 53 F -3.50 0.76 -7.13 
DP23 54 M -3.11 0.27 -5.59 
DP24 54 M -3.24 1.25 -6.58 
DP25 54 F -3.76 1.42 -9.93 
DP26 56 M -6.00 1.25 -3.15 
DP27 56 F -2.45 3.06 -9.62 
DP28 56 F -2.45 1.75 -8.24 
DP29 57 M -2.84 1.75 -2.62 
DP30 58 F -4.16 3.88 -7.81 
DP31 59 M -4.03 1.42 -11.06 
Matching in Prosopagnosia 48 
DP32 61 M -3.24 2.89 -9.52 
DP33 62 M -2.97 1.75 -6.86 
DP34 63 F -2.97 -0.06 -4.31 
DP35 63 F -3.24 3.71 -3.37 
DP36 64 F -2.84 0.27 -2.80 
DP37 64 M -4.16 1.25 -7.91 
DP38 65 M -2.71 1.25 -3.68 
DP39 66 F -2.84 1.91 -5.91 
DP40 66 F -2.71 2.24 -6.46 
 
